Excellent work in reducing unit costs in Q2’16, exceeded expectations.
Disappointing revenue performance.
Excellent ancillary revenues.
Accumulated losses around 200 crore, losses since start of operations around INR 150 crore.
Financial & certain performance data reported by AirAsia India is inconsistent, inaccurate, and unreliable.
Before we begin the analysis of AirAsia India’s performance, it must be noted that the quarter reports of AirAsia are unreliable, on at least four counts, as observed:
The quarter report for Q1’16 (“SECOND QUARTER REPORT ENDED 30 JUNE 2015”) states that in Q1’15, AirAsia India reported a net loss of RM 0.4 Million. However, the quarter report for Q1’15 (“SECOND QUARTER REPORT ENDED 30 JUNE 2014”) states that AirAsia India reported a net loss of RM 13.8 Million. This translates to a difference of RM 13.4 Million / INR 25.9 crore.
The quarter report for Q4’15 (“FIRST QUARTER REPORT ENDED 31 MARCH 2015”) states that in Q4’14, AirAsia India reported a net loss of RM 12.4 Million, which, based on the RM-INR conversion rate prevalent then, converts to INR 22.7 crore. However, the P&L statement in the same Q4’15 report states that AirAsia India had a net loss of only INR 8 crore.
The quarter report for both Q2’16 (“THIRD QUARTER REPORT ENDED 30 JUNE 2015”) and Q2’15 (“THIRD QUARTER REPORT ENDED 30 JUNE 2014”) states that in Q2’15, AirAsia India recorded a net loss of RM 15.7 Million, which converts to INR 29 crore based on the RM-INR conversion rate prevalent then. However, in the Q2’16 report, AirAsia India is stated as having incurred a net loss of INR 52.9 crore.
The flown capacity (ASK) reported by AirAsia India in its quarterly reports is 12%, 5% and 3% higher than what the airline has reported to the DGCA in Q2’16, Q1’16, and Q415. However, in teh two sources of data, the number of flights by the airline match perfectly, and the number of passengers flown are reasonably close.
As a result of (3), we will refrain from comparing Q2’16 data with Q2’15 data, but will only compare Q2’16 data with Q1’16 and Q4’15 data.
As a result of (4), we will refrain from using the AirAsia India flown capacity as reported in the quarterly reports, as this leads to very misleading performance numbers. We stick to the DGCA data.
We had already mentioned the first three points, but the discovery of issue (4) made us withdraw our earlier analysis and revise the numbers. This is the revised analysis.
Due to the ambiguity resulting from points (1), (2) and (3) above, the total losses accumulated by AirAsia India including Q2’16 is around INR 200 crore. Total losses since start of commercial operations (ignoring June 2014) stands at INR 150 crore as reported by AirAsia India.
Q2’16 (July 01st – September 30th, 2015) was AirAsia India’s first full quarter of 5 aircraft operations. In this period, the airline flew 416,182 passengers (excluding no shows: 401,905. No shows : 3%), which is a 38% rise compared to Q1’16, though the number of flights increased by 50%. This explains Q2’16’s load factors of 76%, as against Q1’16’s load factors of 83%. The load factors in Q2’16 were lower than the 79% witnessed in the other lean season – Q4’15. Load factors include no show passengers.
The airline operated 34 daily flights as of 30th September 2015, and flew its millionth passenger in the first half of August 2015.
Q2 is historically a lean season. Capacity in Q2’16 grew by 56% over Q1’16, despite flights increasing by only 50%. This is in line with the average stage length of each flight increasing to 1,208 km/flt from 1,146 km/flt. Low load factors, increase in average stage length, and the low pricing power in the lean season have together resulted in the average fare dropping to INR 2,684 in Q2’16 from INR 3,350 in Q1’16. In Q2’16, AirAsia India did not inaugurate any new routes, but added a frequency on the Bengaluru – Vizag sector, and hence, there was no significant effect of low yields due to new routes.
Ancillary revenues at the airline have picked up very well. From being just 8% of total revenue in Q4’15, to 10% in Q1’16, it touched 15% in Q2’16. This has been aided by the increase in cargo per flight, to an average of 1,205 kg per flight in Q2’16 compared to 1,074 kg/flt in Q1’16 and 971 kg/flt in Q4’15.
However, on a unit basis, the airline’s revenue per available seat kilometre (RASK) suffered a 27% drop from Q1’16 figures, to settle at INR 2.22/seat-km, due to the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The unit revenues are 22% lower than the Q4’15 lean season.
AirAsia India’s cost performance is very good, and has touched record low values in Q2’16.
Unit aircraft fuel expenses fell by 13% in Q2’16 compared to Q1’16, despite fuel prices falling by only 9%. Higher average stage length of 5% can only contribute little to improved fuel consumption. However, tankering and uplifting fuel from stations with low sales tax on fuel may explain a part of the lower fuel expenses. Sales tax at Vishakhapatnam is just 1%, Goa 12.5%, Guwahati 22%, Imphal 20%, and Delhi 20%. Delhi, Guwahati, Imphal and Vishakhapatnam operations, and increased operations to Goa in Q2’16 may have significantly contributed to the drop in fuel costs.
Inexplicably, the staff costs have dropped in Q2’16 compared to Q1’16, from INR 31 crore to INR 29 crore. While there is no obvious explanation for such a drop, it has resulted in the unit staff costs to drop by 41% in Q2’16.
Unit maintenance costs have increased by 2% in Q2’16.
Due to longer flights, capacity has increased by 56% but flights by only 50%, in Q2’16 compared to Q1’16 resulting in the 7% drop in unit user charges and related expenses, which are largely a per-flight expense.
Unit lease expenses have dropped significantly by 29% in Q2’16, attributable to increased aircraft utilisation, higher capacity and no aircraft having to remain on ground in Q2’16. Average lease rental per aircraft per month is INR 2 crore.
Other operating expenses, most of which are fixed, have been diluted by the higher capacity, dropping by 25% in Q2’16.
Other Income, which is treated as part of operations by AirAsia India, increased by 10%, positively impacting the bottom line.
The cumulative effect of increasing frequency, network changes, and increased aircraft utilisation, amongst others, has reduced unit total operational costs at AirAsia India by 21% (including other income which can also be a negative quantity as in Q4’15). This is a brilliant performance, though the drop in staff costs is yet to be clearly identified. One explanation is perhaps the reduction in training expenses due to stagnation of fleet growth, and perhaps the voluntary exit of certain crew.
Break Even Figures
In Q2’16, AirAsia India realised a per-passenger cost of INR 4,621, which is 10% lower than the INR 5,166 cost per passenger in Q1’16, but 15% higher than the INR 4,009 cost per passenger in Q4’15.
In Q1’16, AirAsia India incurred a loss of INR 1,469 per passenger. At the same unit passenger revenue of INR 3,154, AirAsia India would have needed a break-even load factor of 112%.
AirAsia India lost INR 1.04 per seat flown every kilometer, which is 5% lower than INR 1.09/seat-km in Q1’16, but 30% higher than the unit loss incurred in Q4’15.
AirAsia India’s cost structure is depicted in the pie chart. Fuel constitutes 36% of the airline’s expenses.
Cancellations and OTP
Only 6 flights were cancelled by AirAsia India, in Q2’16. The airline operated 3,032 flights, with an average on time performance (OTP) of 87%.
In Q3’16, AirAsia India inducted its 6th aircraft into operations, in the second half of November 2015. Daily flights have gone upto 40, with increase in frequencies and the inauguration of a new route, Delhi – Vishakhapatnam.
Our forecast for AirAsia India’s performance in Q3’16:
Quarter’s Load factors to increase to around 85%.
Capacity to increase by 12% and passengers carried (including no shows) to touch around 520,000.
Average unit passenger revenue may rise by around 20%+ compared to Q2’16.
Certain unit costs to slightly increase due to addition of 6th aircraft and sending one aircraft for half a month for scheduled heavy maintenance.
Certain unit costs to very slightly increase due to weather related delays and diversions.
Ancillary Revenue percentage to drop in light of higher average fare.
For break even, unit passenger revenue must rise by around 45% (compared to Q2’16)
Very slim chance of an operational break-even. More likely in Q1’17 (April – June 2016).
Air Costa, which used to operate 32 daily flights to 9 destinations, will be operating 18 flights to 8 destinations starting today, 16th November, till 26th November, as the airline’s fleet temporarily reduces to just 2 aircraft – one 67 seat Embraer E170 and one 112 seat Embraer E190. No sale of flights on one of the patterns (MAA-HYD-VTZ-BLR-VTZ-HYD-MAA-JAI-MAA) was noticed on the airline’s website. This leads to VTZ not being temporarily served by Air Costa.
VT-LSR, one of the two Embraer E170s, has been pulled out of operations due to the planned return of the aircraft to its lessor. VT-LBR, one of the two Embraer E190s, operated a special Chennai-Bengaluru flight LB709 (the first 7xx flight number for the airline), which is a ferry flight turned commercial flight, before heading off for scheduled maintenance to Jordan via Muscat. This leaves only two airplanes – VT-LNR (E170) and VT-LVR (E190) in the active fleet in the short term.
In contrast to Air Costa cancelling flights, AirAsia India, which presently has one of its Airbus A320 airplanes (VT-BLR) at Hyderabad for scheduled maintenance (Since 1st November), has not allowed operations to be impacted. The airline, which recently received its 6th aircraft (VT-APJ), continues to fly 5 patterns with 5 active aircraft. VT-BLR is expected to return from maintenance today to allow VT-APJ to fly to Delhi to operate additional frequencies on existing routes, from tomorrow. (Edit: VT-BLR flew to Delhi late this morning, and will take on Delhi flights from tomorrow).
The 5/20 rule – allowing airlines to fly international only after completing 5 years of operation and flying a fleet of a minimum of 20 airplanes, was introduced in the year 2005. The year 2005 was the second boom in Indian civil aviation.
Today, in the year 2015, we sit upon the next boom in Indian aviation. Since later 2013, many airlines have started: Air Costa, AirAsia India, Vistara, Air Pegasus and Trujet. The government, exactly 10 years after introducing the 5/20 rule, is going to either retain it, abolish it, or replace the rule. A rule that, on the outside, was intended to both develop domestic capacity and make sure airline operations stabilize before flying international. The true story revolves around the insecurity full service Kingfisher airlines created for one particular airline. Hence, the rule was introduced just before Kingfisher started operations in May 2005.
Since then, the industry has consolidated: Jet-Sahara, Air India-Indian, Kingfisher-Deccan, and the demise of the merged Kingfisher. What has the 5/20 achieved? It has created only 4 international airlines for the world’s largest democracy. Just 4 airlines.
We invite you to read what the 5/20 has done, what its proposed replacement, the 300/600 can do, and whether we must go in for the third option: No rule at all. Please click here.
DGCA published data pertaining to an airline’s performance, commonly quoted by the media, such as Load Factors and OTP, is unreliable and misleading.
The data errors can only be recognized in single fleet airlines and/or airlines that have only recently started operations. In both cases, simplicity allows for cross verification of data.
Investigation into the data errors was suggested by a senior officer of a full service Indian airline.
The most interesting of all airline performance indicators is load factors. Load factors are often looked upon as indicators of successful commercial operations at an airline.
DGCA publishes certain airline related data based on an ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation, a UN body) ATR (Air Transport) ‘FORM A’. This form is filled and submitted by airlines to the DGCA, which the DGCA then uses to report load factors airline wise.
The manner in which the DGCA computes load factors is by dividing Passenger-Kilometers (PK) by Available seat Kilometers (ASK). PK is a product of total passengers flown and the total kilometres flown by the airline in a particular month. ASK is the number of seats on all flights multiplied by the total kilometres flown by the airline in that particular month. Dividing PK by ASK simplifies to the ratio of Passengers Flown by Available Seats, which is the definition of load factor.
Another way of computing load factors is to determine the available seats using data not reported in ICAO ATR FORM A. This is the number of seats on every flight. FORM A mentions the number of departures in a month. In single fleet airlines such as IndiGo, Go Air, AirAsia and Vistara, the number of seats on every aircraft is uniform fleet-wide. This means that every flight on each of the above mentioned airlines flies 180, 180, 180 and 148 seats, respectively.
Multiplying the number of flights by the number of seats per aircraft will result in the number of seats flown in that month. Dividing the number of passengers flown by the number of seats gives us load factors for the month.
The first and second method should result in the same numbers. However, this is not the case. Below is the reported load factors versus the computed load factors for IndiGo since it started operations. The two methods agree with each other till December 2008. From January 2009, when the DGCA changed its format of reporting data, the errors have been present, and have been unacceptably large and inconsistent.
The data shows that, according to computations, domestic load factors at IndiGo never crossed 90%, and that load factors crossed 80% only on 7 occasions in 9 years. Average domestic load factors at the airline, across 9 years, is recomputed as just 71.5%, with the highest at 83.3% in the month of May 2015. Of course, this arguably assumes that the number of departures and the number of passengers reported by the DGCA are correct.
Similarly, AirAsia India’s and Vistara’s load factors are not always representative of the actual load factors. In the case of these two airlines, the error is small. However, every 1% error in load factor corresponds to a monthly revenue of INR 56 lakhs for an airline the size of AirAsia India, and INR 16 crore for an airline the size of IndiGo.
Vistara’s load factors have never crossed 70%.
Below is that of Go air, for 9 months only:
Considering that the data is derived from what airlines have published, it may be that part of the onus for the error rests on airlines. It is difficult to compute the error in load factors of airlines such as SpiceJet, Jet Airways, Air India, and Air Costa.
Faith in our method of computation is based on cross checking certain computed load factors with the information revealed by a senior airline official.
On Time Performance
Airline on time performance is another parameter met with much enthusiasm. For example, for the month of April of 2015, DGCA reported that AirAsia India had an on time performance (OTP) of 100.0%. DGCA mentions the OTP as observed at only four airports: Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Mumbai and Delhi. Back then, AirAsia India was based only out of Bengaluru.
However, Bengaluru International airport, in its On Time Performance (OPT) report for April, clearly mentions AirAsia India’s arrival OTP as 89% and departure OTP as 98%. This averages to 93.5% OTP, which made headlines as 100%. (Click here for an NDTV piece on this)
Similarly, Go Air’s OTP for Bengaluru was reported by the DGCA as 88.9%, while the airport stated that the airline had an arrival OTP of 73% and a departure OTP of 86%. The DGCA’s OTP for Go Air at Bengaluru was impossibly higher than the higher of the two OTP for the airline for that month.
IndiGo’s OTP at Bengaluru was reported as 77.2%, while the airport stated that the airline had an arrival OTP of 73% and a departure OTP of 81%. In this case, the average of the departure and arrival worked out to 77%, which is acceptable.
In the case of SpiceJet, OTP at Bengaluru was reported as 68.2%, while the airport stated that the airline had an arrival OTP of 78% and a departure OTP of 78%. In this case, the reported OTP is lower than the actual OTP of 78%.
Data reported by the DGCA is very informative. The data is used by analysts and major industry bodies for studies, reports, and analysis. However, no matter how good the analysis, junk data in results in junk data out, with misleading facts and figures about the industry and the performance of airlines.
Poor data standards may give airlines a way to falsely drive up their performance figures, which may be for many reasons, such as driving up investor sentiment.
AirAsia India is a wonderful airline, and has got a few things right. Their on board service is one of those.
As an airline, especially a start-up airline, making mistakes is inevitable. Falling short of projected growth plans and heavy flight cancellations and delays in certain months of the first year of operations are acceptable. Both these have happened to AirAsia India, and the industry understands. Of course, there are better examples, such as IndiGo, which has managed to play the game like no other.
The unacceptable part? Factually incorrect statements that can lower the overall credibility of the industry.
Here is an excerpt from the May 20 interview of the AirAsia India CEO, by Ashwini Phadnis, as published in The Hindu Business Line:
How many of the things planned initially have happened and how many have not?
We have done certain things we did not expect. We have flown close to a million passengers. By the time we complete our first year we would have flown more than a million passengers. No other airline in India has done that before in their first year of operations. We have done that with a skeleton fleet, meaning, we have utilised aircraft significantly.
We contest both claims  & , in the interest of factual correctness.
The graph on top (click to enlarge) shows the total number of passengers flown against the first twelve months of operations. All data is from the DGCA.
IndiGo, Kingfisher Airlines, SpiceJet, and Go Air started operations in the 2005-2006 timeframe. Within the first one year of operations, all airlines in consideration, with the exception of Go Air, carried in excess of 1 million passengers. IndiGo crossed the 2 million mark in the first year!
As of 31st March 2015, AirAsia India had carried 550,000 passengers. This means that the airline will need to carry 450,000 passengers to touch the 1 million mark by the end of June (AirAsia India started operations on 12th June, 2014). This means that the airline will need to carry on average 150,000 passengers in the months of April, May and June. Is this achievable?
Data for the month of April and May were not available at the time of writing this piece. Since April had no new flights, but had infact cut 4 – Bangalore- Chennai & back, the airline flew around 97,200 seats in April. With an assumed 82% load factor – their highest so far, the airline could have flown no more than 80,000 passengers in April.
66% of May was flown with 18 flights a day, which totals to approximately 65,000 seats. Effective 21st May, the airline will operate 8 new flights. For 33% of the month this totals to around 47,000 seats. IN total, May can fly only 112,000 seats. At a generous 90% load factor, this is 100,000 passengers.
In June, the airline will fly 28 flights a day, flying approximately 140000 seats a month. At 80% load factor, this will result in around 120,000 passengers being flown.
This means that AirAsia India will close its first year of operations with a maximum of 850,000 passengers, neither meeting nor crossing the 1 million mark.
We wish the airline all the very best for its northern hub operations.
AirAsia India announced its plans to operate to the north, connecting Bangalore with Chandigarh and Jaipur effective September 5th, 2014. The new routes, and an additional frequency on the Goa-Bangalore vv sector will be supported with a fleet of two aircraft.
The second aircraft for AirAsia India is expected to be delivered in the month of August. The plan to fly to the north with the arrival of the second aircraft is in line with Mittu Chandilya’s-CEO AirAsia India-statements on June 12th when AirAsia India started its commercial operations.
Playing on Costa’s Turf
Air Costa, the Vijayawada based regional airline poised to ‘soon’ fly pan India, plays the game of Tier I – Tier II / Tier III connectivity. The airline does not yet fly intra Tier II or Tier III city routes, and does not yet serve Tier III cities.
AirAsia India plays the Air Costa game: The only Tier I city it flies to, out of Bangalore, is Chennai. The other cities on its schedule effective September 5th – Chandigarh, Jaipur, Kochi, Goa- are all Tier II.
With just its second aircraft, AirAsia India will start flying to the north, and tap a fairly neglected route – Bangalore-Jaipur, and open a virgin route- Bangalore-Chandigarh. Bangalore-Chandigarh was on the cards of Air Costa, but the startup regional airline has had to grapple with too many domestic issues to lend it the speed to expand. The only route flown by Air Costa, not served by others, is the Hyderabad-Jaipur non-stop.
But then Air Costa does something that AirAsia doesn’t believe in: it flies three way routes: one variant of a point-to-point network strategy. For example, Air Costa flies Bangalore-Jaipur-Hyderabad: not an immediate return. According to Mittu, “point-to-point means you start from one place, you go to one, and you come back and park the plane. We don’t do three way exotic routes and none of that.”
AirAsia is appearing less of a threat to IndiGo and more to Air Costa, though the two new players have two different aircraft, which makes a direct competition and comparison impossible.
If AirAsia India has well researched its potential Bangalore-Chandigarh traffic, then the airline will stand to reap the benefits of route monopoly. If however the airline doesn’t really fetch the traffic it needs, it would have stimulated the market, allowing Air Costa to then jump in and reap the benefits with a smaller airplane that will cater to a lower demand.
But if the market proves to be really strong, it will attract IndiGo and Air Costa on this virgin route.
On the Jaipur sector, the only other airlines to offer a direct service are Air Costa and Indigo. AirAsia’s departure to Jaipur is timed 35 minutes before Air Costa’s, and leaves Jaipur at 12:45hrs to return to Banaglore. Air Costa however doesn’t fly the return, allowing AirAsia India to tap a noon slot. Air Costa and IndiGo fly Jaipur-Bangalore only in the evening and later evening, respectively.
In essence, AirAsia India has placed itself between Indigo and Air Costa, being a true competitor to neither airline, while easily competing in some form and fashion with either airline on a per route basis.
Not SpiceJet’s cup of ‘tea, coffee, or me’
SpiceJet doesn’t offer any flights from Bangalore to Jaipur, or the return. The only possible all-SpiceJet route, not offered by the airline, is a two stop hop via Hyderabad and Delhi, which is least attractive. This is the fallout of poor frequency, even on the mainlines, effectively negating the network spread achieved by the airline’s dual fleet of Q400s and 737NGs.
On the Chandigarh front, SpiceJet’s least-total duration connection via Delhi makes the journey 5:10hr long, just 15 minutes longer than IndiGo’s connection via Delhi. The direct flight offered by AirAsia is just 2:55hr long.
Increased aircraft Utilization over longer sectors.
A second pattern effective September 5th 2014, when the second aircraft joins the fleet, will comprise of six flights, each with an average flight time of 2:14hrs, resulting in an aircraft utilization of 13:25hrs, with a utilization efficiency of 85%. The higher efficiency is due to the longer flights of Bangalore-Jaipur and return, and Bangalore-Chandigarh and return.
The airline hopes to, and will be able to, manage a 25 minute turnaround at Jaipur and Chandigarh. However, the 25 minutes planned at Bangalore in the first pattern seems surprising, as analyzed previously.
Based on the pattern timings, the second aircraft is likely to arrive towards end August. The airline plans to receive one airplane a month thereafter.
Apparently, Mittu said during yesterday’s Chennai press conference that the airline will induct as many airplanes as required to serve as many routes as possible till there are no route combinations left to fly.
Strong local and P2P focus
If anyone should be happy, it must be Subramanian Swamy. AirAsia’s network will open up routes that will benefit the economy, while as of today, not truly stepping on the toes of another airline. Today, there seems to be no efforts taken by AirAsia India to plan its network so as to feed traffic into its sister subsidiaries of AirAisa Malaysia or Thai AirAsia.
With routes that fly direct from one region to another, AirAsia India also seems to have a ‘regional’ focus, and by diverting traffic this way, can help de-congest airports like Delhi, which has to handle a significant number of transit passengers today.
With the two patterns, AirAsia India will add the capacity to cater to 1 million passengers, annually. As more airplanes come in, and the network and frequency grow, this number will only rise. With an average load factor across all flights today estimated at a realistic 80-85%, the airline will contribute to 800,000-850,000 passenger movements at Bangalore, annually, based on September’s patterns. This may serve to develop Bangalore as a prominent, and possibly a preferred hub and gateway in/to South India.
Double daily to Kochi: Aircraft utilisation crosses 10 hours per day (Aug 14th onward).
Hyderabad seems like the next logical destination.
Airline touches 25 minute turn around, timing though is baffling.
AirAsia India announced the double daily to Kochi today with minimal publicity. The double daily is effective August 14th onward, and that is when the airline’s single aircraft, an A320 registered VT-ATF, will cross 10:00hrs of daily aircraft utilisation. When that happens, the average turnaround time will settle at 30 minutes, and the average block time of each flight will hover around 1 hour.
The airline is yet to utilise the aircraft in the period between 11:20hrs and 15:10hrs: when the aircraft is on ground for almost 4 hours. Disregarding this time on ground, the aircraft’s present utilisation efficiency (total block hours against total time the airplane is used for operations) touches 69%. This number will increase if the aircraft is used on longer sectors, when the airplane spends more time in air.
If the other flights in this pattern are to remain, then the aircraft can operate two 1:10hr block hour sectors in that near 4 hour period on ground.
A 1:10hr block flight (see the green range circle in the adjacent map) is possible if the airline flies to one of the following cities: Vijayawada, Hyderabad, Belgaum or Hubli. Hubli’s airport runway is 5,500ft long, and can just meet the runway requirements for the A320. Alternately, the airline can fly sub-1:10 sectors, which include Madurai, Coimbatore, and Mangalore.
Another interesting point is the timings of AirAsia India’s flights. For its Tier II destinations, AirAsia India’s flights do not compete with the competition. For example, between 12:30 and 13:00, there are three departures to Goa, operated by Indigo, SpiceJet, and Jet Airways, what may be considered the “peak” time for departures to the holiday destination Goa from Bangalore. AirAsia India however fills a wide gap, as seen in the graph for the period wise departures to Goa. As for Kochi, the airline operates flights at times that are not served by other airlines, ensuring a comfortable day return for business passengers to Kochi.
When it comes to the only Tier I city it serves out of Bangalore- Chennai-AirAsia India’s flights do not really fill a gap, but are timed to somewhat coincide with the “peak” timings-beating the early morning IndiGo flight by 20 minutes (and moved in the graph to the 5-6 slot for purposes of clarity although the departure is at 6:05hrs) and positioning itself well to offer another departure just before other airlines offer a string of departures in every time period between 19:00 and 23:00hrs.
Loads, however, on the early morning Bangalore-Chennai vv run aren’t as great as the Goa loads, hovering at 65-70% only.
It will only be prudent for an airline to now tap another relatively denser route. AirAsia India’s aircraft is on ground between 11:20hrs and 15:10hrs. With 30 minute turnarounds, the airline can operate a 11:50 departure to a destination to which the block time is 1:10, and operate the return at 13:30 from that destination.
Of the four cities that are a block hour 1:10hrs away, Hyderabad seems lucrative as it is a Tier I route. Interestingly, a departure at 11:50 will coincide with the period which appears to be favourable for departures to Hyderabad. Between 10:00hrs and 13:00hrs, there are five departures to Hyderabad from Bangalore. No other period is as dense.
With this analysis, Hyderabad appears to be a good destination to fly to. Vijayawada, Hubli, and Belgaum may not have the loads for economically viable 180 seat airplane operations; such destinations are presently serviced by SpiceJet’s 78 seat Bombardier Q400s and AirCosta’s 67 seat Embraer E170.
If Hyderabad ‘happens’, the airline’s sole aircraft’s utilisation will touch 12:35hrs: a very impressive figure considering Air Costa plans a maximum of 11:25hrs utilisation on its E170s, with 1 hour sectors (just like AirAsia’s sectors today) even with a 20 minute turn around. AirAsia manages this by starting operations one hour earlier and stopping two-and-a-half hours after Air Costa’s.
Interesting Turnaround targets: Touching the holy 25 minute
The pattern for their single aircraft reveal some interesting data. At Cochin and Bangalore, the airline targets a 25-minute turnaround at Bangalore and Cochin between the Chennai and Cochin flights, and the Bangalore and Cochin flights. These are the only two turnarounds that are in line with AirAsia Group’s target of 25 minutes for domestic flights. Interestingly, the 25 minute turnaround at Bangalore is planned between 8:30AM IST – 8:55AM IST: the peak period for aircraft movements at the airport, when chances for delays due to congestion are higher (look at the Bangalore airport traffic density in the graph on the right).
To facilitate a faster turnaround, AirAsia uses the aerobridges between flights: passengers are encouraged to deplane from the front (aerobridge) and the rear (stairs and then apron busses), while boarding is completed via the front entry only.
To be able to consistently meet a very short turnaround target of 25 minutes, AirAsia must resort to a method of queuing passengers in the order of last seat first in, to allow the cabin to settle faster. The practicality of such an implementation is another matter of discussion.
Goa is the latest addition to AirAsia’s destinations.
AirAsia Group CEO Tony’s tweet, last afternoon, “Very very proud to announce AirAsia India open for sale tomorrow. Wow. First flight June 12th. Ser you all In India on the 12th“, was the group’s Indian startup’s battle cry. The first sectors are expected to be Bangalore-Goa, and Bangalore-Chennai.
All that AirAsia India’s voice, Mittu Chandilya, has been claiming till date, will be put to test: the airfares, claimed to be 30% lower than regular airfares of other airlines; the turnaround time: an optimistic 20 minutes, and more.
Almost five hours later, the battle cry was responded to, by SpiceJet. It announced a ‘Special Promotional fare’ coinciding with AirAsia’s first commercial flight – June 12th- on two popular routes in South India by offering tickets as low as Rs 1,499, excluding statutory taxes. Including taxes, this amounts to INR 2,058. This all inclusive fare is 60% lower than that offered by other carriers for Bangalore-Goa flights on 12th June.
Coinciding with the formal announcement, Sanjiv Kapoor, COO of SpiceJet tweeted, “How does Rs 1499/- ow for MAA-BLR vv or BLR-GOA vv starting June 12 sound? That’s the lowest allowed by DGCA. Should we? 😉“
This is SpiceJet’s pre-emptive strike on the market, hours before AirAsia India opens up its portals for booking on these sectors.
Kaneswaran Avili, SpiceJet’s Chief Commercial Officer, and former director-business development at AirAsia, is making SpiceJet go the way of AirAsia in stimulating the market and shoring up revenues through carefully planned and limited promotional airfares. With Kaneswaran on board, AirAsia will be competing with an airline that has one of its original own, but till lacks the economies of scale, and operational streamlining that AirAsia India will enjoy by being a part of the AirAsia group.
Edit: But AirAsia India shocked the population with INR 990 fares from Bangalore – Goa. This has miffed SpiceJet, which was at the receiving end of DGCA’s flak for selling INR 1/- fares (with tax amounting to around INR 450 for Bangalore – Goa), and was told to not sell below INR 1,499. Many see this as unfairness meted out to an Indian airline.
AirAsia India is officially launching on May 30th: exactly two years after the now defunct AirAsia Japan launched (opened for sale of tickets) in 2012.
The sale of tickets is expected to commence later today at around 23:00hrs (11pm).
In a move to keep its staff happy, IndiGo recently hiked the pay of its staff, including those of its captains, senior first officers, first officers, junior first officers, as well as cabin crew. While a captain’s gross pay has reportedly been hiked in the range of 15%, the cabin crew’s pay has close to doubled.
The salary hike is effective from the month of December, and serves to bring cheers to crew members who have, reportedly and apparently, felt that they have given the company their all, working to help push the airline to profits, but haven’t received a hike for “so many years".
Many approachable, polite and fair-playing management pilots have apparently resigned, to the dismay of many pilots.
An IndiGo management pilot has moved to Air Asia India, making him the first IndiGo pilot to join the flight deck staff at the regional low cost carrier that is yet to start domestic operations in India.
“Leading" the change
IndiGo is a well performing airline, if one is to look at their load factors (the highest average in the country), their fleet, and the reported profits. All is well till competition sets in. Aditya Ghosh, CEO of IndiGo, had told Business Standard, “I don’t lose sleep over AirAsia".
But there may be reason. Not certain, but strong, to lose sleep. Many pilots are willing to accept INR 20,000-30,000 lower gross pay per month, if they are promised a better work culture, in line with what Air Asia offers today, to its staff. Say many, if offered the same or even a slightly lesser salary, they’re willing to leave their airline for Air Asia, if they feel they can go to work happy.
To many line captains, happiness is worth more than approximately INR 4,00,000 per year. Finally, happiness has a price tag.
Aditya Ghosh is known to be dynamic. He is known to interact freely with his employees, and he set off a new trend in the Indian airline industry: being funny, sometimes witty, and doing many things pleasingly different.
With Mittu Chandilya stepping in as the face of Air Asia India, the spotlight is now shared and slowly shifting to an impressive former model who is seen with sport cars; among young students at universities of repute; playing cricket with his staff; personally attending certain cabin crew selections; first hand observing operations at the airline; promoting causes; and importantly, running his own Facebook page for fans to follow. While Aditya Ghosh’s spotlight-shyness is respected, Mittu’s emergence into the spotlight, not necessarily to talk about himself, sets the latter apart.
Infact, it propels Mittu’s image, and consequently the airline’s image, to a new level: run by confident, open men who love not fun, but loads of it, while not compromising on what matters: work, safety, and the people who run the airline. Whether this will actually translate into how the airline is run is hard to tell, yet, but most are willing to take the chance.
Feel many pilots: “ I’d want to work for, or be led by a dynamic, impressive man. Someone like Mittu Chandilya. He’s inspirational."
It’s not just the money. It’s the promise of a satisfying, fair, and exciting work culture coupled with the dynamism of a CEO who’s a natural in pleasing and leading, possibly reflecting what the airline may turn out to be. Ofcourse, a lot goes into the operational success of an airline, but small yet important things like an impressive leader, and good work culture can help with staff loyalty, something which is definitely part of any company’s definition of success.
Air Asia recently received the world’s first “Sharklet”-equipped A320 for commercial operations. Indigo and Go air will very soon have VT-IFH and VT-GOL flying in the Indian skies; both equipped with “sharklets”. Ever wanted to know more about these “Sharklets” that are grabbing headlines today?
Here is a comprehensive article on Winglets, or what Airbus prefers to call them: “Sharklets”, which are “Hunting down fuel burn“.